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Abstract: This paper argues for an interdisciplinary interlocution between social theory 
and social philosophy in order to recast the problem of normativity in social practices, 
especially within Brazil’s democratic ethos. By resorting to insights from critical theory 
and social epistemology, the essay proposes to reexamine Bourdieu’s conception of 
habitus so as to contribute to a moderate social constructionism that cannot be reduced 
to a postmodernist discourse or to a variant of relativism.
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Resumo: O artigo defende uma interlocução interdisciplinar entre teoria social e 
filosofia social, com o fito de reformular o problema da normatividade nas práticas 
sociais, especialmente no contexto de um ethos democrático brasileiro. Recorrendo 
a aportes de teoria crítica e de epistemologia social, o texto propõe-se a reexaminar 
a concepção de habitus de Bourdieu, de forma a contribuir para um construcionismo 
social mitigado que não pode ser reduzido a um discurso pós-moderno ou a uma versão 
de relativismo.
Palavras-chave: ethos democrático; filosofia social; habitus; normatividade; teoria crítica
1. One of the best approaches to make sense of ongoing social, political 
problems in Brazil is by means of an interdisciplinary research program that 
takes into account both the complex historical and cultural makeup of the 
Brazilian people, including its modern quest for a national identity, and the 
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social analyses that seek to unveil their rationale combined with economic 
and political variables. In this essay, I shall try to offer some insights into the 
Brazilian reception of a critical social theory, as I reconsider contributions both 
from sociological and normative standpoints in interdisciplinary researches 
that seek precisely to avoid the theoretical imposition of particular categories 
upon different social contexts, so as to attend to the critical insertion of such 
analyses to be carried out, as it were, as an “immanent critique” of such 
complex processes and phenomena. The so-called liberation theology and 
related grassroots movements that flourished in Brazil in the 1960s and 70s, 
leading up to the consolidation of a social-democratic political culture with the 
election of two presidents from the Workers’ Party, Lula da Silva (2003-2010) 
and Dilma Rousseff (2011-present), were in many ways indebted to the 
emancipatory, neo-Marxist research program of critical theory (Kritische 
Theorie), just as they recast some of the complex insights into Brazilian identity 
as originally offered by the social, historical analyses of national thinkers such 
as Gilberto Freyre, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, Florestan Fernandes, Celso 
Furtado, Raymundo Faoro and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, together with 
the seminal contributions by left-wing intellectuals such as Helio Jaguaribe, 
Alvaro  Pinto  and  Nelson  Werneck  Sodré.  In  effect,  Brazilian  liberation 
philosophy interestingly recasts Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud’s hermeneutics of 
suspicion in rather agonistic, structural or functionalist terms that reappropriate 
(especially in authors such as Rubem Alves, Augusto Boal, Paulo Freire and 
Leonardo Boff) the mixed blessings of critical theory in the utopian, negative 
dialectics of its first-generation exponents (Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer, 
Bloch, Marcuse), without attending to the normative, sociological claims that 
would characterize the pragmatist turn of the second and third generations 
of the Frankfurt School (Habermas, Honneth). My working hypothesis here 
is that the sociological and normative deficits that one still finds in various 
proposals of critical theory can be filled in by a phenomenology of liberation 
that takes both critical theory and cultural studies into account, particularly the 
questions of gender, ethnicity, and race, beyond the capitalist-socialist divide. 
What I have dubbed the phenomenological deficit of critical theory allows 
indeed for the recasting of a phenomenology of liberation, precisely at the 
level of a weak social constructionism that mitigates and mediates some of the 
too-strong, objectivist claims of Marxism in liberation philosophy and some 
of the too-weak, subjectivist “representations” of postcolonial and cultural 
studies. In this sense, the fate of critical theory and of social philosophy in 
Latin America hinges upon the very consolidation of social democracy, itself 
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It is my contention here that, from a critical-theoretical standpoint, Brazilian 
social democracy may successfully take into account both the conservative 
criticisms of egalitarianism, populism, and paternalism (as found in political 
thinkers such as Denis Rosenfield) and the radical critique from the far-left (in 
Marxist philosophers like João Quartim de Moraes).
In order to account for the normative dimension of a Brazilian democratic 
ethos  we  must  tackle  some  of  the  very  problems  lying  at  the  so-called 
“transition to democracy” shift from a 21-year military dictatorship to a full 
constitutional democracy in Brazil with the draft of the 1988 Constitution, so 
as to address the programmatic question: “Why, after all, should we stand up 
for democracy?”As I argued in a previous essay, the ongoing democratization 
process began with the transfer of power to a civilian president in 1985 and 
was both tried and radicalized with the impeachment of President-elect Collor 
in 1992, but is still under way, given all the social, economic inequalities 
and stances of corruption, impunity, and patrimonialism that continue to 
haunt this nation (De Oliveira, 2004, p. 40). The social, political history of 
modern Brazil certainly helps us understand how we became this unequal, 
hybrid society characterized, in Weberian terms, both by modern features of 
rationalization, secularization, capitalism, and liberalism, and by premodern 
structures of feudalism, patrimonialism, and clientelism. Some might suggest 
that this is the very reason why Brazil remains a natural candidate for the 
postmodern  condition,  insofar  as  modernity  and  its  emancipatory  ideals 
of autonomy, liberal, representative democracy, and social egalitarianism 
never came into full expression in most Latin American societies. In effect, 
the challenge of rethinking the meaning of our modern ethos is even more 
accentuated in our self-understanding of Brazilian social life. In this article, 
I should like to partially revisit this problem in social theory by recourse to a 
social philosophical articulation of critical theory that takes self-understanding, 
socialization and reflexivity seriously, without the facile, uncritical importation 
of European categories or reinventing the wheel in another Latin-American, 
delirious patchwork.
2. In a recent research, I sought to reexamine Habermas’s conception 
of  lifeworld  (Lebenswelt)  in  tandem  with  Rawls’s  procedural  device  of 
reflective equilibrium so as to recast Honneth’s theory of recognition in terms 
of a reflexive, democratic ethos (De Oliveira, 2009). Honneth’s conception 
of reflexive democracy first appeared as an alternative to substantive models 
of liberation and participation (such as Arendt’s republican conception of 
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their restrictive views of the public, political arenas (Rawls and Habermas). 
The idea of a “reflexive democracy” is also found in Olson and related to 
Giddens’s conception of “reflexive modernity” (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 
1994; Olson, 2006). More recently, Honneth spoke of reflexive freedom 
as a more defensible conception than the classical liberal view of negative 
freedom of contractualism and as the intermediate stage leading towards a 
social conception of freedom, which turns out to be an important element 
in his reactualization of Hegel’s philosophy of right, as an alternative to 
both republican and procedural trends in Habermas’s model of democracy 
(Honneth, 2011, p. 44-117).
In order to come up with a self-understanding of whatever could be 
reasonably proposed as a Latin American or a specifically Brazilian take on 
critical social theory, one must of course be aware of many risks and limitations 
in trying to embark on this kind of interdisciplinary, crosscultural research 
program, but I am convinced that this remains a certain, fruitful pathway to 
pursue. Let me just add that any interdisciplinary research in theories of social 
justice and democracy must avoid the two extremes of becoming too trivial 
and predictable either by focusing only on concrete, empirical finds in field 
research (e.g., data, statistics, and figures) relating to Brazilian social reality or 
by becoming so conceptually abstract to the point of losing contact with social 
reality. So-called “Latin Americanists” or “Brazilianists” are understandably 
more prone to fall into the first kind of reductionism, while social and political 
philosophers tend to take for granted their supposedly “universal” categories 
and conceptual schemes. One of the guiding questions for an interdisciplinary 
research program in democracy within the framework of Latin American and 
Brazilian studies could be thus recast: “Is there any such thing as a Latin 
American or Brazilian social philosophy?” Whenever one is faced with the 
challenge of doing Latin American or Brazilian social philosophy today, one 
must inevitably address the Heideggerian question whether philosophy isn’t 
after all a European undertaking and all theoretical approaches to our social 
reality would somehow be Eurocentric. As it has become a commonplace 
nowadays, while so-called continental philosophers tend to value historical, 
structural features in their approach, analytic philosophers would simply deal 
with concepts in their logical, semantic coherence and clarity, without paying 
too much attention to their historical, cultural genesis. And yet, the challenge 
of making sense of a Latin American philosophy has been actually pursued by 
both continental and analytical thinkers, not without reservations, concessions, 
and suspicions (Nuccetelli, Schutte and Bueno, 2010). Social philosophy 
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social theory that tries to account for the complexity of social phenomena and 
analyses that bring together European and non-Western elements.
All in all, if one regards philosophy as a worldview, lifestyle or mindset 
– contra Heidegger –, it is certainly the case that all Latin American indigenous 
peoples and non-Western traditions overall have their own respective sets of 
beliefs about the cosmos, life, and death. And yet anthropological, historical, 
and empirical descriptions of particular cultures, social worlds, common 
practices, myths and beliefs do not seem to count as philosophical accounts 
of “philosophy”, which seem to presuppose critical inquiry, reflexivity, and 
impartiality, even if not necessarily understood in analytic, systematic or 
even universalist terms. So it seems perfectly reasonable to recast a Latin 
American or Brazilian social philosophy properly understood through the 
ongoing interactive, dialogical encounter between European and non-Western 
traditions, that is, insofar as it succeeds in rescuing the characteristically Latin 
American/Brazilian features of the highly complex, subtle combinations of 
Latin American indigenous thought and Afro-Latin American traditions with 
European nomadic thinking, reflecting the ongoing flux of Asiatic migrations, 
African  and  Semitic  diasporas  which  ultimately  make  Latin  American 
Philosophy  quite  unique  (Medina,  1992).  There  remains  the  normative 
challenge of subscribing to cultural relativism without embracing ethical 
relativism.
3. As noted above, it seems indeed plausible to reconstruct a social 
phenomenology of the Brazilian ethos by resorting to Habermas’s tripartite, 
intersubjective aspects of the lifeworld oriented toward socially, linguistically 
shared  understanding  of  everyday  practices,  understood  in  hermeneutic, 
reflexive terms, so as to deal with the moral, legal, and political contexts of 
signification, the problem of a normative conception of the person, and the 
challenge of a reasonable pluralism (Habermas, 1984; 1989), A grammar of 
fairness must thus go beyond the procedural, fair distribution of material goods, 
and must be correlated to the fundamental principle of recognition (doing 
justice to the other in her otherness) and its implicit moral grammar of social 
conflicts, as Honneth has argued, in order to avoid equating cultural relativism 
with moral relativism and the postmodernist dissolution of the aesthetic and 
normative substance of the social lifeworld. I have thus assumed that the 
lifeworld (Lebenswelt) stands overall for the horizon of socially, culturally 
sedimented linguistic meanings that make up the background environment of 
competences, practices, and attitudes shared by social actors, without being 
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systems and lifeworld lies, therefore, at the bottom of the normative grounds 
of social criticism, just as the basic ideas of cooperation and competition have 
determined social philosophical approaches to political theory. Following 
Habermas and Honneth’s criticisms of systemic, instrumentalized power, 
we may recast reflexive self-formations in a democratic political culture 
through intersubjective recognition and social policies for distributive justice, 
so that they cannot ultimately be separated from their correlated lifeworldly 
practices of self-esteem, self-care, and self-understanding. Honneth’s theory 
of recognition successfully revisits the critique of power so as to address the 
phenomenological deficit of critical theory inherent in any attempt to breaks 
away from the demonization of technological, instrumental domination of 
nature and human exploitation (Honneth, 1996). The ongoing democratization 
of emerging societies and developing countries like Brazil is a complex 
process that has engaged diverse segments of civil society and still has a long 
way to go, as a reflexive model of radical democracy is to be accomplished 
not only by social movements from below, let alone by governors, the elites 
or intellectuals, as it were, from above, but ultimately by civil society as a 
whole and its deliberative, reflective commitments to solidarity and networks 
of social cooperation. What is at stake, after all, is the institutionalization of 
the social world, beyond traditional accounts of society and state. Honneth has 
convincingly shown the impossibility of maintaining communicative reason 
immune from the instrumentalization of social action in the very attempt to 
tackle the paradox of the rationalization of lifeworldly relations, as anticipated 
by Habermas’s own account of socialization. Honneth seeks thus to rescue 
the lifeworldly, civil society’s locus of the democratic ethos, which tends to 
be eclipsed by Rawls’s idea of public reason and Habermas’s public sphere 
(Honneth, 1998). By all criteria, the normative thrust of a democratic ethos 
has been one of the major contributions of Habermas’s monumental work to 
a discourse theory of law and democracy (between facts and norms, dealing 
with both Faktizität and Geltung) and to the critical theory of a democratic 
Sittlichkeit such as the one recently proposed by his successor (Honneth and 
Joas, 1988; Habermas, 1998). To the extent that those pathologies cannot 
be tackled by the social engineering of systemic globalization and the latter 
equated with the ongoing democratization of institutions worldwide, the 
normative dimension of “theories of justice” must be translated into the very 
challenges faced by the Brazilian transition to democracy, particularly those 
taken up by civil society, social movements, and organizations –including, but 
not limited to, NGOs. The main problem of my research can be now restated: 
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whose democratic ethos is still in the making?” By effecting a rapprochement 
between the procedural conceptions of a reflective equilibrium (Rawls) and the 
lifeworld (Habermas) I have aimed at a hermeneutics of normativity correlated 
to the facticity of a democratic ethos inherent in a pluralist, political culture, 
capable of integrating semantic and pragmatic aspects of a gamut of practices 
and codifications (modus vivendi) that could be reasonably identified with 
that social ethos. Such a recasting of reflexive, democratic ethos, in this case, 
proves quite suitable for our endless experiments trying to make sense of the 
normative challenges of social-democratization in Brazil. Brazilian social and 
political thought in the 20th century has been caught between authoritarianism 
and democratization, under the sign of modernization, massive migrations 
from rural to urban areas, social movements, and the intellectual inputs of 
positivism and Marxism (Stepan, 1989). Even as we speak of modernization 
in  Brazil,  we  must  call  into  question  a  reduction  of  modernization  to 
rationalization, secularization, and the differentiation of systemic spheres, as 
both premodern and modern forms of social life and institutional arrangements 
coexist in our reflexive, democratic ethos. In effect, subtle and explicit forms 
of authoritarianism are not only to be understood in systemic terms, say, in 
governmental, administrative, juridical, and political stances, but end up 
betraying a certain cumplicity and tacit consent across different segments 
of civil society and even within the social tissue of everyday practices, as 
attested by the so-called jeitinho or the Brazilian way of bending the law, rules, 
and norms. Furthermore, the Brazilian dream of realizing a social democracy 
has been ultimately haunted by two populist pathologies at the heart of their 
political culture of paternalist cordiality: the myth of racial democracy and 
the liberationist utopia of social egalitarianism. While the conservative elites 
promoted the former and still call into question intersectional approaches to 
race and ethnic relations in Brazil, leftist and socially-engaged segments of 
society tend to take social democracy for granted as a socialist promise to be 
delivered by a paternalist State to the poor. In order to avoid the ideological 
trends of this kind of approach, social theory must recast its own epistemic, 
normative claims in dialogue with social philosophy.
4. The Brazilian democratic ethos must deal with its own normative 
deficits from within. We must thus turn to “fieldwork in philosophy” in order 
to tackle not only the question of the Brazilian way itself, but whatever makes 
human sociability a determinate social ethos, a concrete Sittlichkeit, so as to 
address the question: “what is sociality all about?” After all, the full meaning of 
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social, cultural identities, where social practices are at once constitutive and 
regulative, in a normative sense that transcends a political, national identity 
(as denounced by social criticisms of totalitarian and nationalist regimes) but 
remains within the immanent, structural view of a social ontology. It seems that 
both a robust theory of social practice such as Pierre Bourdieu’s conception 
of habitus and a weak social constructionism or a moderate constructivism 
converge on successfully responding to the systematic criticisms raised by 
analytic, social epistemology, by showing how they cannot be reduced to a 
postmodernist hype of sorts (“social construction of what?”) nor be taken for 
another variant of relativism. Bourdieu’s social theory departs, in effect, from a 
critique of sociological deficits within linguistic theories that fail to make sense 
of the inextricable connection between language and social life, including 
structuralist and other fashionable trends that seduced many continental circles 
in the last quarter of the 20th century.
In the preface to his major work – Le sens pratique (Bourdieu, 1980a), 
which was regarded as a carefully revised and enlarged version of his Outline of 
a Theory of Practice (1972) –, Bourdieu stages the problematic of a sociology of 
knowledge that articulates social theory and cultural practice without reducing 
the former to a mere epistemological discourse (as Mannheim’s work was then 
dismissed) or the latter to an aesthetic symbolism (as most poststructuralists and 
postmodernists were identified with). Bourdieu situates thus his own contribution 
to the methodology of the social sciences somewhere between ethnology1 and 
the history of social ideas, i.e. in terms of a “sociology of culture” and “social 
history”, in a strategic move that reminds of Foucault’s own recasting of cultural 
history vis-à-vis the École des Annales (Chartier, 1988). Moreover, Bourdieu’s 
pronounced interest in the sociological relation between language and power 
points to his methodological departure from Saussurean structuralism and Marxist 
positivism. The double-hermeneutical character of Bourdieu’s social methodology 
can be clearly discerned in his critical account of the institutionalized distinction 
between “ethnology” and “sociology”, in that the anthropologist’s “splitting” 
(dédoublement) or “separation” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 34) vis-à-vis her/his object 
of investigation often betrays a veritable “philologism” as the decoding of a given   
culture and its symbols naively presupposes an original, “true” meaning. Bourdieu’s 
“double-hermeneutical” method is explicitly stated elsewhere, for instance, in 
Questions de sociologie: “The sociology of sociology is not... one ‘specialty’ 
among others but one of the first conditions of a scientific sociology” (Bourdieu, 
1  “Ethnologie”, in French, understood as “cultural anthropology”, as opposed to both physical 
and  philosophical  anthropology.  Bourdieu  expressly  calls  into  question  epistemological 
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1980b, p. 22). Therefore, in order to analyze the social world and its practices, one 
must first overcome the dualistic opposition of theoretical knowledge to practical 
knowledge. For neither the anthropologist nor the sociologist can avoid the pitfalls 
of “intuitive participation”, on the one hand, and “ethnocentrism”, on the other, 
unless they first recognize the “practical sense” (le sens pratique) which, according 
to Bourdieu, underlies all modes of theoretical knowledge. That is why Bourdieu 
sets out to “overcome” the subjectivism-objectivism dichotomy of objectivist and 
ethnomethodological modes of theoretical knowledge by reintegrating different 
sociological conceptions (notably, those of habitus, “field”, and “class”) at the very 
constitutive level of social practices to be observed and studied by anthropologists 
and sociologists. In effect, the relation between the observer and what is being 
observed is a particular case of the knowing-doing relation, which Bourdieu defines 
as the relation between a logic of theorizing (“logical logic”) and a practicing logic 
(“pre-logical logic”). It is precisely to elucidate the sense of the latter (“the logic 
of practice”, “le sens pratique”) that Bourdieu goes on to elaborate a “Critique of 
theoretical reason”.
One legitimate question that can be raised as one goes through the first five 
chapters of Bourdieu’s magnum opus is whether he is not ultimately seeking 
to reconcile the very phenomenological and objectivist views he criticizes. 
For Bourdieu, a science of the social world cannot be reduced either to a 
social phenomenology or to a social physics. Thus he seeks to “move beyond” 
(dépasser) the antagonism between these two modes of knowledge, so as to 
pass from the modus operatum to the modus operandi of social objectification. 
And yet his critique claims to construct the theory of the mode of generation 
of practices at the same time that it establishes an experimental science that 
requires, as a necessary moment in all research, “methodological objectivism”. 
In social-epistemological we are dealing here with the problem of realism 
in opposition to noncognitivist and relativist views calling into question 
the possibility of objectivity. Bourdieu recasts a dialectical tension between 
“genesis” and “structure”, between “empirical” analysis and “transcendental” 
synthesis, in a radical attempt to break away from the ahistorical objectification 
of structuralism and the intellectualist voluntarism of French phenomenology 
and rational-choice theories. Although it raises “the forgotten question of the 
particular conditions which make the doxic experience of the social world 
possible” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 44), objectivism always implies a radical 
discontinuity between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge.
5. What both Saussure and Lévi-Strauss objectify in a structural, regulating 
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an “objectifying relationship”, i.e. the epistemological break which, according to 
Bourdieu, is also a social discontinuity. Thus, Bourdieu’s motto, “to objectify the 
objectification” (objectiver l’objectivation), translates his efforts to theorize the 
relationship between experiential meaning made explicit by social phenomenology 
and the objective meaning that is constructed by social physics or semiology. 
To move beyond the subject-object antinomy, one has not only to break with 
the native experience and the native representation of that experience but also to 
call into question the presuppositions inherent in the position of the “objective” 
observer –whom Bourdieu accuses of tending to privilege both epistemic and 
communicative functions.
Bourdieu’s theory of practice seeks thus to rid such an objectifying mode 
of knowledge of the distortions arising from the epistemological and social 
conditions of its production. By analyzing the logic of practice in its pre-reflective 
objectifying relations, Bourdieu seems to call into question an academically 
established tradition that articulates the theory-praxis nexus in terms of value. 
This, to my mind, serves to explain why Bourdieu places his critique of Jon 
Elster’s methodological individualism on the same level of his attack upon 
Sartre’s voluntarist, finalist theory of action. I refrain from pronouncing here a 
hasty judgment on Bourdieu’s critique of Elster, simply because I am assuming 
that Bourdieu’s entire theory of practice systematically addresses this particular 
problem. Thus when Elster accuses Bourdieu of inconsistently mixing a “causal 
account” and an “intentional and functional explanation” in the latter’s conception 
of “distinction” (Elster, 1983, p. 69s), Elster deliberately fails to take into account 
Bourdieu’s relational (as opposed to valued) logic of practice and its holistic 
implications for the overcoming of the individual-society dichotomy. The social 
conception of habitus, developed in the third chapter, appears thus as a decisive 
feature of Bourdieu’s critique of rational action theory and his ultimate attempt 
to come up with a conception of social practice that avoids the pitfalls of both 
continental and analytic accounts.
In order to arrive at a definition of habitus vis-à-vis the objectification of 
practices, Bourdieu returns to his critique of objectivism. According to this view, 
the social world is constituted as a “spectacle offered to an observer who takes 
up a ‘point of view’ on the action and who, putting into the object the principles 
of his relation to the object, proceeds as it were intended solely for knowledge 
and as if the interactions within it were purely symbolic exchanges” (Bourdieu, 
1980a, p. 87). As against positivist materialism, the theory of practice claims that 
the objects of knowledge are constructed, not passively recorded, and, contrary 
to intellectualist idealism, that “ the principle of this construction is the system of 
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and is always oriented towards practical functions” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 87). As 
Bourdieu himself indicates, what is actually at stake is not simply reversing Marx’s 
eleventh “Thesis on Feuerbach” once again (namely, to interpret what has been 
changed, as it were, in der Praxis), but returning to “the this-sidedness” of social, 
practical activity (say, as stated in Theses 1 and 2). In other words, to escape 
the dualism of the realism of the structure and the idealism of transcendental 
dialectic, Bourdieu rehabilitates Marxian social praxis (qua practice tout court) 
as “the site of the dialectic of the opus operatum and the modus operandi; of 
the objectified products and the incorporated products of historical practice; of 
structures and habitus”(Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 88). Although keeping his distance 
from “official” Marxists (PCF intellectuals & Co.), Bourdieu clearly draws his 
structural conception of society from the “middle” Marx’s2 notion of class as 
the primary unity of analysis and its correlative function in the production and 
reproduction of social life, besides the systematic accounts of Durkheimian and 
Weberian influences that contribute to Bourdieu’s sociology.
Bourdieu’s conception of habitus cannot be separated from the structurally 
correlated terms “class” and “field”.3 In effect, according to Bourdieu, society is a 
system of relatively autonomous but structurally homologous fields. In one of his 
most puzzling formulas, Bourdieu goes on to assert:
{(habitus) (capital)} + field = practice (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101s).
Bourdieu seeks thus to avoid the hierarchical approach of structuralists 
by defining habitus as the system of internalized dispositions mediating 
between social structures and practical activities, being shaped by the former 
and regulating the latter. As he put it bluntly,
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions 
of existence produce habitus,  systems  of  durable,  transposable 
dispositions,  structured  structures  predisposed  to  function  as 
structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and 
organize  practices  and  representations  that  can  be  objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming 
at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to 
attain them. Objectively “regulated” and “regular” without being in 
any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a 
conductor (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 88).
2  Notably the Marx of the “Theses on Feuerbach” and The German ideology.
3  The French word champ is semantically undercoded by the English term “field” – “discipline, force 
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A difficulty that immediately arises is, of course, related to the problem 
of social agency. After all, what is wrong with the conductor? For Bourdieu, 
the socialized agent, contra structuralism and rational-choice theories, is to be 
distinguished from the subject and the free individual (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 17s, 
78s). Thus the habitus may well be accompanied by “strategic calculation” 
but, even in this case, the latter remains at the level of responsiveness in 
that conscious responses are themselves defined “in relation to objective 
potentialities, immediately inscribed in the present, things to do or not to 
do, things to say or not to say, in relation to a probable, ‘upcoming’ future 
(un à venir), which... puts itself forward with an urgency and a claim to 
existence that excludes all deliberation”(Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 89). Bourdieu 
goes on to assert that “stimuli do not exist for practice in their objective truth”, 
they always already presuppose “agents conditioned to recognize them”. I 
think this rather puzzling emphasis on the structural nature of his “science 
of practice” is what accounts for much of the widespread misunderstanding 
among Bourdieu’s critics. Although I shall not seek to take his defense in 
this essay, I think Bourdieu’s point here is that a social account of action, 
in order to keep its social specificity, must presuppose that the social world 
is indeed “a world of already realized ends” (e. g. “procedures to follow”, 
“paths to take”) in accordance with the “permanent teleological character” 
of its “tools or institutions”. In order to illustrate Bourdieu’s appropriation of 
this quasi-phenomenological conception of the social world, it would suffice 
to recall the Heideggerian, trivial example of the hammer (Being and time 
§§ 15-18) in his famous “Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in 
General”, where each piece of equipment is defined in terms of what one 
uses it for (Bewandtnis, “involvement” but also its “functionality”). I cannot 
understand what a hammer is unless I recognize its place in the whole, its 
use in the way it is normally used, etc. Now, I can certainly use a hammer, 
say, as a weight that I place on top of loose papers to keep them from being 
scattered. And yet any other heavy object would do (a stone, for instance, or 
better still, a paper-weight). The main difference between the “genuine” and 
any other use of the hammer, as Heidegger points out, lies in the transparency 
of the former – so, when hammering a nail, “the hammering itself uncovers 
the specific ‘manipulability’ [Handlichkeit] of the hammer”  (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 98). In the same vein, a social institution like the church can be 
“used”, say, in a revolutionary situation such as in Latin America, for purposes 
other than worshipping God (at least not in the traditional way). However, 
even the most irreligious liberationists committed to a Marxist program 
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historical  institution  of  the  church  as  a  religious  ekklesia.  In  fact,  the   
ideological  impasse  of  liberation  theologies,  in  their  de-ideologizing, 
deconstructive moves, points to the impossibility of “isolating” individual 
agencies of emancipation (i. e. women, blacks, natives, homosexuals, and so 
forth) from the social structure to be transformed. Moreover, it simply became 
impossible to focus only on one source of oppression (e. g. the military, US 
imperialism  or  Western  capitalism)  in  the  network  of  “institutionalized 
violence”. This problem, being a structural one, seems to rather indicate that 
the very genesis of a social institution based on a logic of identity does not 
allow for liberating action to take place within the boundaries imposed by its 
raison d’être. Therefore, Bourdieu is not so much proposing a new “theory of 
action” as articulating the social structuring of any practice which takes place   
in-the-world.  The  limitations  of  a  sour-grape  situation  is  precisely  that 
it  remains  too  decontextualized,  too  idealized  –  or,  as  Bourdieu  calls  it 
“idéaltypique”. Even though it truly depicts a common situation which can 
take place in everyday life, Elster’s “rational actor” theory undermines the 
structural givenness of the social world, at once constituted by and constitutive 
of a bodily Dasein, always already a socially contextualized being: “Practical 
sense is a quasi-bodily involvement in the world which presupposes no 
representation either of the body or of the world, still less of their relationship” 
(Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 111).
6. Bourdieu’s immanent critique of rationality reintroduces thus the 
Wittgensteinian notions of game and play (the French jeu translating both in 
one single term, as the German Spiel) to illustrate his conception of “practical 
sense” as “feel for the game” (sens du jeu). The proleptic adjustment implied 
by  Wittgenstein’s  notion  of  language-games  allows  Bourdieu  to  speak 
of the relation between habitus and social field as the learning of a game, 
homologous to what the acquisition of a mother tongue is to the learning of 
a foreign  language. Just as beliefs imply, for the later Wittgenstein, a system 
of propositions, Bourdieu concludes that “belief is thus an inherent part of 
belonging to a field” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 113). Granted, belief is understood 
here in its most accomplished form, as naive, native doxa, diametrically 
opposed to Kant’s “pragmatic faith”: “Doxa is the relationship of immediate 
adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to 
which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows 
from practical sense.” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 115).
Because it is an état de corps rather than an état d’âme (“disposition 
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processes but simply appears as the agent’s passageway between habitus and 
social fields. According to Bourdieu,
Practical sense, social necessity turned into nature, converted into 
motor schemes and body automatisms, is what causes practices, in 
and through what makes them obscure to the eyes of their producers, 
to be sensible, that is, informed by a common sense. It is because 
agents never know completely what they are doing that what they do 
has more sense than they know (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 116).
Bourdieu gives several examples from his own ethnographic researches 
in Kabyle culture to illustrate the subject’s socializing “thrownness” in her/
his everyday existence (e. g., the organization of the internal space of their 
house, which Bourdieu relates to their male/female structuring of sexuality). 
The conclusions of Bourdieu’s field researches can be summed up in these two 
rather descriptive quotes:
The  structures  that  help  to  construct  the  world  of  objects  are 
constructed in the practice of a world of objects constructed in 
accordance with the same structures. The ‘subject’ born of the world 
of objects does not arise as a subjectivity facing an objectivity: the 
objective universe is made up of objects which are the product of 
objectifying operations structured according to the same structures 
that the habitus applies to them. The habitus  is a metaphor of the 
world of objects, which is itself an endless circle of metaphors that 
mirror each other ad infinitum (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 130).
And he goes on to make it explicit:
In a society divided into classes, all the products of a given agent, by 
an essential overdetermination, speak inseparably and simultaneously 
of his/her class – or, more precisely, his/her position and rising or 
falling trajectory within the social structure – and of his/her body – 
or, more precisely, of all the properties, always socially qualified, of 
which he/she is the bearer: sexual ones, of course, but also physical 
properties that are praised, like strength or beauty, or stigmatized 
(Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 134).
We can easily gather that the double poststructuralist problematic of the 
metaphysical, binary logic (“thinking in couples”) and the philosophy of the 
subject (unity of a transcendental signified) underlies Bourdieu’s theory of 
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practice”), notably when Bourdieu criticizes the ahistorical “time” of scientific 
theory: “Practice unfolds in time and it has all the correlative properties, such 
as irreversibility, that synchronization destroys” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p.137). For 
practice’s tempo (rhythm) is constitutive of its meaning. “Science has a time 
which is not that of practice.” And he concludes, in a quasi-Heideggerian play 
on words: “The ‘feel’ (sens) for the game is the sense of the imminent future 
[à-venir] of the game, the sense of the direction [sens] of the history of the 
game that gives the game its sense” (Bourdieu, 1980a, p. 138).
7. That Bourdieu’s “feel for the game” is applied to his own playful account 
of social practices and sociological theories constitutes no great surprise. I think 
one should leave aside this matter of style and taste when reading Bourdieu’s 
works – after all, perhaps against his own will, Bourdieu is indeed representative of 
the new Homo academicus gallicus – would this “confirm” his theory of habitus? 
In any case, I should like to bring in the problem of the logic of the social sciences, 
once again, in the present context of the Methodenstreit. Bourdieu ridicules 
science’s use of “synoptic diagrams” to apprehend simultaneously and in a single 
glance, uno intuitu et tota simul (Descartes) what, in practice, cannot be totalized 
without overlooking the very constitutive “nature” of these facts. It seems that we 
would be returning to the old value-facts question – and Bourdieu, to my mind, 
is very aware of this post-Kantian problematic, especially in his appropriation of 
Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts. His account of the structuralist ideology 
of rational discontinuities, betrayed in the theoretical conception of genealogies, 
maps, and calendars, points to his own poststructuralist concern with a history 
of ideas. Thus, when he says that “practice has a logic which is not that of the 
logician”, he is seriously attempting a way out of Bachelard’s metaphorology 
and Althusser’s logicism. In this regard, I think that Wittgenstein is more than 
a source of inspiration for Bourdieu, in that language-games do not require a 
rational, theoretical understanding of the rules on the part of players involved. It 
remains to be shown whether Bourdieu’s “logic of practice” fulfills the practical 
functions promised by his theory of practice.
By way of conclusion, we can still resort to such an interesting conception 
of practice as habitus and combine it with recent developments in critical theory 
and social epistemology. For the Latin term habitus recasts somewhat the 
normative thrust of the Aristotelian notion of hexis and the civilizational, 
psychic individuation as it had already been used by Norbert Elias, as early 
as 1939, to refer to our “second nature” in the particular structures molded by 
social attitudes.
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Individuals have a habitus, which, generically speaking, refers to 
the internalization and embodiment of attitudes and  knowledge 
shared by the specific social class or group to which they belong. 
But each individual is  also able to engage in active, creative social 
interactions beyond his/hers social groups based on a cognitive and 
affective charting of society as a whole. This ability to map out and 
deal with the social world is affected in both practical and intellectual 
terms by the position each individual occupies in the social system. 
However this very ability presupposes that a world of values, codes, 
and knowledge is shared with the rest of society – and this is what 
constitutes the form of sociability observed in a given nation (or any 
other social system or subsystem) (Sorj, 2000, p. 47).
Normativity is practical insofar as humans are conceived of as social 
beings,  in  their  relational,  intersubjective,  societal,  moral,  ethical,  legal, 
and political dealings. There remains a huge social epistemological task of 
relating this to a specifically theoretical take on knowledge, belief, and reason, 
without falling back into the theoretical reductions denounced by Bourdieu. 
There are indeed positive and negative features in both camps (continental 
social theorists and analytic philosophers) and we must continually seek 
to avoid reductionisms of both transcendental and naturalist camps, such 
as  phenomenalism  and  physicalism,  in  our  constant  avoidance  of  both 
postmodernist,  social  constructionism  and  positivist  realism.  The  very 
emergence of social epistemology within the analytic camp may strike some 
of us as an analytic recasting of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s solipsism and of the 
phenomenological, hermeneutical critical appropriation of Neo-Kantianism, 
so as to overcome the Platonic-Cartesian conception of knowledge as “justified 
true belief” and to unveil knowledge as “intrinsically social”(Goldman and 
Whitcomb, 2010). Our ongoing interdisciplinary research in social philosophy, 
especially in light of this proficuous interlocution with social epistemology and 
critical theory, might help us elaborate on analyses which mobilize habitus 
both in terms of their theoretical articulation and in terms of their grounding 
in empirical reality. On the one had, social practices have primacy over 
theoretical devices, just as sociability is prior to ethics and the political, as 
sociality unveils itself in the natural becoming of humans, as social evolution 
takes place within biological, evolutionary processes. On the other hand, 
naturalism cannot account for all reflexive, social developments, precisely 
because human beings also participate as social actors in the construction 
of this social reality. Even if one can no longer resort to a religious or moral 
principle as an absolute way of “giving reasons” for such and such action, the 
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question. John Searle’s ingenious account attempted precisely at solving that 
problem, as he combined a systematic account of epistemic objectivity with 
an ontological subjectivity that, in the last analysis, complements hermeneutic, 
phenomenological accounts such as the one proposed by Berger and Luckmann 
almost thirty years earlier (Searle, 1995; Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Even 
though one doesn’t have to go so far as to say that everything has been socially 
constructed or deny objectivity in scientific endeavors, it is quite reasonable 
to conceive of social practices in terms of constructionism, just as moral 
and political contractualism can be nowadays recast as variants of Kantian 
constructivism (Hacking, 1999).
It  seems,  therefore,  that  one  may  well  proceed  from  an  epistemic 
justification towards a moral epistemic justification (as long as one is not 
committed to an extreme noncognitivist view of ethics), so that one’s goal 
may as well be having a system of moral beliefs and acting in accordance 
with moral epistemic norms. Substantive ethics and every case of normative 
ethics, including applied ethics, must come into being in social reality. Moral 
beliefs can be certainly justified according to traditional arguments of moral 
realism, universalism, intuitionism, and robust conceptions of rationality, as 
they are still justified on religious grounds. To be sure, many people would 
object, today, to religious and philosophical justifications. Social theory proves 
extremely helpful in keeping social philosophy and social epistemology closer 
to real, concrete people and their social, intersubjective relations.  One may 
always move back and forth from descriptive to motivating and normative 
reasons, but one can never get rid of his/her sociality.
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